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In Mali, where rates of attendance at healthcare facilities remain far below what is needed, three user fee
exemption policies were instituted to promote access to care. These related to HIV/AIDS treatment, as of 2004,
caesarean sections, since 2005, and treatment of malaria in children under five and pregnant women, since 2007.
Our qualitative study compared these three policies, looking at their implementation provisions, functioning and
outcomes. In each healthcare facility, we analysed documentation and carried out three months of on-site
observations. We also conducted a total of 254 formal and informal interviews with health personnel and patients.
While these exemptions substantially improved users’ access to care, their implementation revealed deep
dysfunctions in the health system that undermined them all, regardless of the policy studied. These policies
provoked resistance among health professionals that manifested in their practices and revealed, in particular, the
profit-generation logic within which they operate today. These dysfunctions reflect the State’s incapacity to
exercise its regulatory role and to establish policies that are aligned with the way the health system really works.
Introduction
The conditions governing access to basic facilities are a
source of ever-increasing inequality in a number of sub-
Saharan countries and seriously jeopardize achievement
of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 [1].
Under pressure from international bodies, and mindful
of the need to correct the negative impact of the cost
recovery system, states have tried to improve access to
healthcare [2]. This is the background against which
policies of total or partial fee exemptions have been
adopted, in partial divergence from the previous cost
recovery policy. Three user fee exemptions have been
introduced in Mali, where attendance at health centres
falls well below real needs (primary care consultations
rose from 0.18 new cases per inhabitant per year in
1998 to 0.35 in 2010). These three exemptions relate to
HIV/AIDS treatment, as of 2004, caesarean sections,
since 2005, and the treatment of malaria in children
under five and pregnant women, since 2007.
Documentation of these policies has been slow, espe-
cially in West Africa [2,3]. Studies initially focused on
the policies’ impacts and encountered certain difficulties
in evaluating the effectiveness of complex interventions
in their natural context [4,5]. The achievement of antici-
pated effects (increased visits to healthcare facilities and
improved access for the poorest families) has been
widely documented through quantitative surveys [6,7].
For example, studies in the Kayes region and Bamako in
Mali showed that free caesareans have significantly
reduced catastrophic expenditure associated with such
treatment, mainly among women living in urban areas
[8]. The free availability of anti-malarial drugs for chil-
dren under five has led to a perceptible rise in the num-
ber of visits to health centres, although the increase is
smaller than expected [7,9].
Regarding the conditions surrounding implementation
of the new policies, a 2011 national conference on fee
exemption policies in Bamako [10] reported on some
concerns among health professionals, circle councils, and
community health associations regarding these free care
policies. They were especially concerned about their
financial viability and about the impacts of user fee
exemptions for malaria treatment on the financial auton-
omy of community health centres. They also stressed the
need to plan and reinforce measures to support these
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policies. At the conclusion of this national conference, all
stakeholders pointed to the need for more knowledge on
the dynamics of the implementation process.
After these policies had been in force for a few years,
it was important to (a) document and compare the
uptake of user fee exemptions policies by those respon-
sible for their implementation (i.e., health workers) and
(b) evaluate the policies’ impact on the health system
and the circular nature of the dynamic. Exemption poli-
cies in Africa have had an impact on most health system
functions [11], with respect to WHO and universal cov-
erage [12]. However, in the specific context of our study
in Mali, we studied essentially the impacts on the health
services provision function. We compared different poli-
cies in identical contexts (an approach rarely used
before now) to better understand the factors underlying
their success or failure and particularly what role the
common substratum, i.e., the health system and its pro-
vision of services, played in the results.
Methods
This was a qualitative study involving case studies [13].
We began by conducting interviews at the national level
and consulting available documentation (service notes,
activity reports, etc.) to understand the framework estab-
lished for each policy, as a foundation for analysing the
gap between those provisions and the actual conditions
of implementation on the ground (Table 1).
To study the free care policies related to caesareans
and malaria, we selected Bamako and the regions of
Kayes and Sikasso. For the policy related to HIV, we
focussed only on Bamako.
Bamako was selected because it is an urban environ-
ment that is close to decision-making and supply points.
In Bamako, we selected the Commune 1 health district
because it contains Mali’s first CSCOM (community
health centre), has a well-recognized CSREF (referral
hospital), and is made up of neighbourhoods of very dif-
ferent standings. The Kayes region was selected because
the Canadian Council for International Co-operation is
involved in maternal health in that region and has con-
ducted quantitative studies that are complementary to
our qualitative approach [14]. In that region we selected
Kita district because it is also a sentinel site for malaria
control, which suggested good conditions for implemen-
tation. In the Sikasso region, we selected the Sikasso dis-
trict because it offered a rather advantageous health
setting, with no major structural impediments to the suc-
cessful implementation of major free care policies. In
these three districts of the three regions, we selected
three health centres. First, the three referral health cen-
tres (CSREFs) were studied, as these are the district refer-
ral hospitals. Then, we selected the two most contrasted
community health centres (CSCOM) in the districts. The
contrast was determined based on their degree of isola-
tion, which has an influence on information, supervision,
and drug supply, but also on health worker and commu-
nity organization dynamics, as well as on the level of use
of the CSCOM by the population (Table 2). The manage-
ment of caesareans was studied in two CSREFs in
Bamako and Kita, and at the Sikasso regional hospital, a
public institution that enjoys a degree of independent
management. We observed a total of 58 cases of caesar-
eans at the three sites.
To vary the management status of multiple sites (pub-
lic, semi-public or private centres, which do not function
in the same ways) in a single given context, we studied
the management of HIV/AIDS patients in the district of
Bamako alone, selecting three sites. The first was the
CESAC (advice and counselling centre), an associative-
and, as such, private-treatment centre run by ARCAD-
SIDA (association for research, communication and
home assistance for persons living with HIV/AIDS) and
devoted exclusively to the management of HIV/AIDS.
The second was the CSREF of Commune 2, a public
health centre offering fully integrated management of the
disease. The third was the USAC (care, support and
counselling unit) of the CSREF of Commune 1. This unit,
Table 1 Number and types of interviews conducted at the national level.
Groups Number
Managers in the Ministry of Health, at the national and regional levels 16
Managers in the HIV/AIDS program 8
Managers in the malaria program 3
Managers at the Ministry of Health specialized in caesareans 1
Technical and financial partners (United Nations agencies, bilateral cooperation agencies) 16
National NGOs 9
International NGOs in Mali 6
Medical experts 3
Officials from the presidency of the republic 2
Total 64
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which specialized in HIV/AIDs, was located in a public
health centre but had a certain level of autonomy; it was
funded by ARCAD-SIDA with the CSREF’s backing.
In each site, the research team carried out a documen-
tary analysis (data produced by the health information
service and service notes), three months of on-site obser-
vation, and formal and informal interviews with health-
care workers and patients. Our team was made up of a
researcher in charge of studying the emergence and
implementation of the three policies at the national level
and a team of three research assistants supervised by the
author of the article; each research assistant was in
charge of one of the study sites, for each of the three
policies. We conducted in-depth qualitative interviews
with different categories of personnel (service chiefs,
physicians and residents, nurses or midwives, nurses’
aides or matrons) in the services affected by the free care
policies in each of the selected health centres. Respon-
dents were selected to ensure that all categories of health
workers were represented in our sample so that all possi-
ble viewpoints would be included. We also interviewed
patients and those accompanying them during our on-
site observation periods, whose care we were able to
observe before their discharge (Table 3).
By triangulating information in this way and by long
immersion in the field, we were able to record not only
interactions between actors, but also the conditions in
which patients were managed, above and beyond what
health professionals reported about their practices. The
data (daily observations recorded in notebooks, interview
transcripts) were subjected to thematic analysis (with the
construction of a thematic tree) and interpretation. The
data were examined and discussed, and data relating to
different themes and sites were compared. The research
was authorized by the ethics committee of the INRSP
(National Institute of Public Health Research: 9-000011/
CE-INRSP). The field surveys were conducted between
September 2010 and December 2011, and the research
findings were presented at a meeting in Bamako in
November 2012.
The three policies are presented below. In each case we
focus first on the action plan adopted for each and then
on their operationalization and the results achieved.
Finally, we show how malfunctions within the health sys-
tem had much the same effect on all three policies,
despite the policies’ very different functions.
Results
The policy of free healthcare for HIV/AIDS treatment
National policy background
As defined by law in 2006, free healthcare for HIV/AIDS
sufferers entails access to antiretroviral drugs and to con-
traceptives for men and women; absorption of the cost of
consultations, analyses, and screening; and the biological
monitoring and treatment of opportunistic diseases.
Hence, the policy confers substantial and undisputed
rights on a single category of patients.
Unchallenged at the national level, the user fee exemp-
tion for HIV/AIDS patients also benefits from consider-
able financial support from international partners,
especially the Global Fund. From 2006 to 2009, internal
resources only amounted to between 18% and 26% of the
total budget allocated to HIV/AIDS in Mali [15]. Since
its introduction, the fee exemption has also benefited
from extensive technical support in the form of manage-
ment of supplies (specialist software, technical assistants,
Table 2 The nine sites involved in the study of the three policies.
Study
district
Free malaria care policy Free
caesarean
policy
Free HIV/AIDS care policy





Urban, well attended, dynamic team
Rural CSCOM Kafana Rural, isolated, health mutual, well enough
attended








Good performance, oldest in the country,
popular neighbourhood
USAC Commune 1 Bamako; AIDS procedure =
associative unit in the public centre
CSCOM Commune 1
Djelibougou
Recent, well-off neighbourhood CESAC
Associative centre
Kita CSREF Kita District hospital CSREF Kita N/A
CSCOM Djidian Isolated, elderly retired physician,
community dynamics
CSCOM Badinko Well located but poorly attended, new
physician
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training and logistics), a training policy of unrivalled
scope, the establishment of a follow-up system with the
resources to match, and a monitoring system. However,
this monitoring system was essentially based on quantita-
tive indicators, designed to render accounts to donor
agencies, and as such not very useful for capturing the
implementation process as required for our study.
“This type of free healthcare has more partners than
the others. The partners even provide logistical support
for distributing ARVs at the regional level. Effectiveness
in combating AIDS is determined at the partner level,”
(Official, Regional health authority).
Another distinguishing feature of this policy in Mali is
that it is largely implemented at the operational level by
the associative sector, which is private. The HIV/AIDS
treatment programme was set up by the association
ARCAD-SIDA at a time when the State confined its
involvement to promoting prevention. Thus, the pro-
gramme to fight the disease was largely developed along-
side government structures, around and with the support
of community associations specializing in the medical
management of the disease. This was something new to
Mali. On the strength of donations from the Global
Fund, measures were negotiated to support this form of
free healthcare. These measures included advantageous
conditions for those working in associative structures,
adherence clubs, and home visits, as well as salaries for
psychosocial counsellors providing comprehensive man-
agement and for data entry clerks to support more care-
ful planning; these latter personnel could in fact earn the
same or more than physicians working in the public
sector.
“In the beginning, our relations with the hospital staff
were good, but since the Global Fund came in, the doc-
tors, who often earn less than what is paid to us, the
psychosocial counsellors, are frustrated. This translates
into a refusal to collaborate. The pharmacist doesn’t
send us the list of patients lost to follow-up and doesn’t
send us non-compliant patients.” (PLHIV, member of a
seropositive patients association).
At the time of our study, the State was heavily
involved in fighting the disease; however, associative
organizations still managed more than 50% of the
patients being treated.
The implementation of this policy in healthcare facilities
This free healthcare policy has been a success on the
whole, thanks in large measure to both the technical
and financial support provided from abroad and the
dynamism of the associative sector. As a result, there
has been an exponential increase in the number of
patients receiving treatment. According to official fig-
ures [16], in December 2011, of the 42,000 individuals
estimated by USAIDS to be in need of treatment in
Mali, 29,237 were taking antiretroviral drugs and being
regularly monitored at 100 healthcare sites, which distri-
bute the drugs free of charge.
Compared with the two other conditions studied
(malaria and caesareans), and according to the observa-
tions and interviews conducted in the different health
services during this study, the quality of the system pro-
viding patient care, including the public system, is rea-
sonably satisfactory. Our study showed that, in a
healthcare system characterized by a general climate of
indifference towards patients as individuals and nearly
non-existent communication between caregivers and
patients, the relations that have developed with people
living with AIDS and HIV (PLWHIV) are completely
unprecedented and privileged.
“We have to show those suffering from the disease that
we are not afraid of them, and show more concern for
them socially as individuals. Often, one becomes friends
with the person, more so than with other illnesses,” (Phy-
sician, CSREF).
“With Dr X., I feel as if she’s family; she’s interested in
all her patients’ social problems and gives good advice.
You feel comfortable with her, you’re on the same level.
Dr X. is willing to spend the time to calm you down, to
reassure you, so that you even end up forgetting that
you’re ill,” (PLWHIV, public system patient).
Our empirical results showed that, in practice, both
health workers and patients reported that these improve-
ments took the form of a more individualized approach
and more specialized response, imposed by national and
international standards but also relatively well interna-
lized: longer consultation periods; explanations given to
patients about the different aspects of their illness; real-
time listening; and visible efforts to ensure a degree of
confidentiality in a setting that militates against it, given
Table 3 Number and types of interviews conducted in the sites.
Free healthcare
policies
Number of interviews with health
professionals
Number of interviews with community
leaders*
Number of interviews with
patients/carers
Caesareans 36 25
Malaria 36 6 37
HIV/AIDS 35 15
Total 107 6 77
* Community leaders are involved only in community health centres (CSCOM) and have no role with regard to caesareans or HIV/AIDS management.
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the level of responsibility imposed on the caregivers and
the cramped premises.
Nevertheless, while demand at the global level had
been increasing exponentially, the funding for HIV had
fallen off markedly. In Mali, this situation led to narrower
targeting of resources, a development that prompted ser-
ious frustration within the country and produced cracks
in the model system. Beginning in 2008/2009, as needs
increased significantly and the worsening financial crisis
led to a drop in rich countries’ contributions to the “com-
mon pot” that was the Global Fund, fewer funds were
available at the global level for HIV/AIDS. Difficult nego-
tiations had to be undertaken at the national level, and
priority was given to medical care and ARV availability,
to the detriment of prevention or community support
activities, largely provided by the associative sector.
The comparative approach we adopted in our study
revealed the existence of a two-tiered system. The asso-
ciative sector had managed to sustain the gains it made
in terms of quality of services and the free healthcare
package by resorting to funding that was parallel to that
of the Global Fund (and particularly the financial contri-
bution of international NGOs such as AIDES, etc.). In
the public sector, there was a growing tendency for the
management of HIV-positive patients to be de-prioritized
as these patients were increasingly subjected to the usual
public services malfunctions that affect quality of care.
Both health workers in the services involved and patients
reported long waiting times for consultations, the lack of
even a superficial rapport with the prescribing or dispen-
sing doctor, staff turnover, the repeated absence of skilled
workers, and faulty equipment. Also in the public health
system, according to the worried observation of the
Cellule Sectorielle de Lutte Contre le Sida (CSLS -
Sectoral AIDS Control Cell) with whom we met, there
was an appreciable increase in the number of patients
lost to follow-up. On top of all this, the scope of free care
was gradually shrinking, especially due to the unpredict-
able availability of reagents that resulted in longer inter-
vals between check-ups. Stock shortages of medicines
to prevent or treat opportunistic infections were becom-
ing more common, and community and support services
(e.g. support groups, communal meals) were being
abandoned.
The Global Fund temporarily withdrew its funding in
late 2010 after an investigative mission by the Office of the
Inspector General ostensibly identified irregularities in
both the public and associative sectors. While this inter-
ruption of funding had serious consequences, in a context
of political and security tensions (overthrow of the govern-
ment, occupation of northern Mali by jihadists), it showed
the resilience of the HIV/AIDS management system,
owing greatly to the part played by community associa-
tions and the technical and financial support received. Our
interviews with officials in the national HIV/AIDS pro-
gramme, with international partners, and with workers in
the treatment centres showed that, despite not being paid
for several months, until the Global Fund resumed fund-
ing, association staff carried on dispensing ARVs and
operating the follow-up system, without which the activ-
ities would have been seriously compromised. Free health-
care during that time was confined to the management of
ARVs, which had been maintained thanks to a significant
financial contribution by the State. They were managed
with the utmost rigour, and every precaution was taken so
that stock shortages would not become an issue; in parti-
cular, a very effective network was established between
community and government management bodies to facili-
tate a constant exchange of free inputs.
However, according to the same respondents encoun-
tered in our study, donors said that such management
was proving too costly, since the system was largely
funded from outside the country. More than half the
patients taking ARVs were being treated in sites run by
associations, whose funding (for human resources and
operating costs) was almost entirely dependent on the
Global Fund.
“Donors feel that health management is very expensive
in Mali because most of the work is undertaken by pri-
vate bodies, with workers being paid four or five times
more, not to mention the other costs,” (Staff member,
international NGO).
The succession of crises that have undermined the fight
against HIV/AIDS has persuaded the Malian government
and its international partners to consider institutionaliz-
ing the HIV/AIDS programme. To generate economies
of scale and to avoid escalation of financial dependency,
there is talk of promoting integrated management of the
various chronic diseases, and “of ending the isolation sur-
rounding AIDS” (according to an official on the Health
Ministry’s National HIV/AIDS Committee) by gradually
incorporating the associative sector into the public one-
despite the public sector’s de-prioritization of HIV/AIDS
management, and at the risk of compromising outcomes.
These fears were expressed by respondents in the asso-
ciative sector as well as in the CSLS, who pointed to the
poorer quality of treatment provided in the public sector.
The free healthcare policy for caesareans
National policy background
The free healthcare policy relating to caesareans is a
measure of the State’s determination to reaffirm its
sovereignty in decisions about national healthcare poli-
cies vis-à-vis its technical and financial partners [15]. The
policy is funded entirely from the national budget. How-
ever, in an effort to contain costs, neither the support
measures nor the supervision programme contemplated
in the preliminary discussions were retained. Nor did this
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scheme benefit from the technical support of partners;
even today, instances of support from international colla-
borators are few and far between, mainly taking the form
of communication campaigns and the funding of a
national evaluation.
The policy is one of an on-going series of reforms
aimed at improving technical facilities and human
resources for maternal health. In the case of caesareans,
free treatment applies to the surgical procedure and prior
examinations, kits for operations and post-operative
treatment, and hospitalization. At the time of our inter-
views, although aware of the serious problems posed by
dystocic pregnancies before free healthcare, staff had
reservations about the State’s ability to sustain this policy
due to the high costs involved. They accepted it, but
without enthusiasm, especially since the measure was
announced before the technical system was discussed
and devised. In fact, its scope was unclear and difficult to
pin down, and the initial scheme did not provide for the
management of complicated caesareans. The kit for cae-
sareans was based on hospital standards in Bamako, with
no consultation or respect for practices in the health cen-
tres performing caesareans. To make matters worse, at
the operational level, healthcare facilities were compelled
to borrow from their own regular stocks to compensate
for failures in the supply of inputs for the free caesareans
policy from the central level (erratic funding, incomplete
kits).
It quickly became obvious that the number of caesar-
eans was growing markedly and steadily. The rate for the
country as a whole rose from 0.94% in 2005 to 2.17% in
2008 [17], despite these shortcomings and a deficient
referral and evacuation system, which, as our compara-
tive analysis has shown (interviews with personnel,
accounts of evacuation conditions for rural patients),
penalizes rural areas and women from disadvantaged
backgrounds.
“Our greatest difficulty is the more than 100 km dis-
tance between our CSCOM and the CSREF. In my two
years as medical chief of this CSCOM, the community
health association and the mayor’s office have not done
their share. Because of this, patients have had to pay the
ambulance charges themselves, sometimes as much as
37,000F [XOF],” (Medical chief, remote CSCOM, Kita).
The implementation of this policy in healthcare facilities
As our study began in 2010, we were unable to observe
the management of caesareans before the introduction of
the free care policy. However, the accounts of women
who underwent caesareans before and after the policy
and of health professionals involved in those services
revealed that staff physicians often handed the procedure
over to other physicians, either from within or outside
their centre, rather than performing the procedure with
their assistance. The latter were poorly paid (7 500 XOF
per month), as they were considered trainees. They were
employed for on-call duty but also for day-time service.
Staff physicians devoted a portion of their work time to
interventions in the private sector, working in the public
sector primarily in cases of emergencies (serious compli-
cations) or when performing scheduled caesareans on
patients with whom “financial arrangements” (fees paid
to the gynaecologist by the patient) were made during
their pregnancy care. Both staff physicians and trainees
also sought to supplement incomes they considered to be
low (even non-existent, in the case of trainees) by char-
ging patients unwarranted fees.
The free caesarean policy disrupted this usual way of
functioning in the services involved, by increasing work-
loads and depriving health professionals of these “com-
pensatory” informal payments.
“Before free caesareans, the gynaecologists made up
their own kits according to their orders, and they were
able to make a profit on those products. Often, the
gynaecologist would bring his own products, but would
take the money and then use his own products, and
this, on top of what we were paid by parents for the act.
This free care policy is a loss for gynaecologists, I won’t
deny it. Even if we take money from the women, it’s not
like before the free care, as the products [kits] are given
free of charge, even though reconstituted kits mean that
those accompanying the women pay for the products,”
(Personnel, Sikasso).
A few years into this policy, local staff came to realize
that not only was there an absolute increase in their
workload, as more caesareans were being carried out,
but also that they were losing out financially.
In fact, the sums reimbursed by the State were not
being redistributed among the staff but were being
folded into the general revenues of the health centres; at
best, some of this income was distributed in annual
bonuses, which were seen as insignificant. In addition,
the amount paid by the State (XOF 10,000) per proce-
dure was well short of the amount a gynaecologist could
have obtained before, informally, for a caesarean.
The difficulties encountered at the national level (erratic
funding, incomplete kits) added to the dissatisfaction [17].
There was no hope of securing support measures for this
policy, such as incentive payments, as these would involve
further expenditure by a government already struggling to
cope with the policy’s spiralling costs. According to the
Finance Department of the Ministry of Health, between
2005 and 2009, the average annual funding rose from
XOF 461 million in 2004 to XOF 1,753 billion in 2009, an
average annual rate of increase of 40%. A growing discon-
tent was observed among staff physicians, especially those
able to work in private clinics, as was the case in Bamako
or Sikasso, and the quality of services, already limited, was
compromised even further. This undoubtedly explained
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the increase in puerperal infections and suppurations
between 2006 and 2009 [17].
“The facts are unpalatable but they still need stating:
it’s the junior doctors who perform the majority of cae-
sareans without being supervised by the gynaecologist,
who spends all his time on consultations and private
work to make more money. This explains why a number
of women experience infections and other internal pro-
blems after their operations, such as uterine ruptures,
etc. We all like earning money, and there’s no money in
caesareans anymore,” (Physician, CSREF, Bamako).
The healthcare facilities often ‘trimmed-down’ the kits
received, as the local professionals generally considered
their contents to be too elaborate, excessive, and not
always necessary. This conclusion was debatable, as the
hospital experts at the central level who determined the
kits’ contents considered them essential. Occasionally
the contents were stretched to create more kits. How-
ever, items that were removed and did not go into other
kits were neither given to patients nor returned to the
pool of non-chargeable items, and were often sold for
personal gain.
“The system of free caesareans is chaotic, and there are
no proper standards. For example, each centre actually
puts its own kits together in any way it pleases. There is a
standard content decided by academics, but the fact of the
matter is that, if the centre receives 100 kits, it will make
them stretch to 150 by using the same items, as some of
these are sent in large quantities. And the 50 extra ones
come in very handy for the anaesthetists, the gynaecolo-
gists and the pharmacy,” (Staff member, CSREF, Sikasso).
The rise in caesareans also put extra pressure on
equipment, which was often of poor quality, badly man-
aged (electricity bills not paid, waste, theft) and badly
maintained (machines not working, new equipment not
installed).
“Surgeons have enough equipment to perform caesar-
eans but just don’t look after it. Equipment is stolen by
workers for their own clinics, and, worse still, things are
often thrown into the wash after an operation and,
when they come out again, are not put back,” (Manager,
CSREF, Bamako).
A victim of the policy’s success (increase in caesar-
eans) and of the wasting of free inputs, in 2011 the
State was faced with a growing deficit for this policy. It
reacted by allowing delays to accumulate in the payment
of orders placed by the Treasury (basically, kits for cae-
sareans), which left the public pharmacy, the Pharmacie
Populaire du Mali (PPM), vulnerable and caused a
degree of disruption and interruptions to supplies.
“It’s been almost a year since we last received any kits
for complicated caesareans. I’m not quite sure why, but,
as I understand it, the DRS [Regional Health Authority]
has run up quite a debt on these items. To be perfectly
frank, I think free healthcare has had its day. The two
remaining kits, for the operation and post-operation
stages, have less and less in them, and there’s always
something missing from them. The number of kits sent
to us by the DRS is also declining. It fell from 300 to
200, and now it’s only 100,” (Staff member, Regional
hospital, Sikasso).
“The State is no longer able to pay the PPM the kind
of money that would guarantee a proper supply of pro-
ducts. The point is that the PPM is a business. The
situation is catastrophic, and this is why our needs are
fulfilled less and less. Kits for complicated caesareans
have become increasingly scarce,” (Official, Regional
health authority, Sikasso).
At the national level, the administration can no longer
guarantee reimbursement of the money spent by health
centres.
“As an accountant for the referral health centre [I can
tell you], if you take caesareans, we haven’t had the
money for 2009, let alone 2010. The State really isn’t
paying up,” (Staff member, CSREF, Bamako).
The follow-up system, geared towards compiling the
information required for reimbursement of caesareans
performed, did not track how the kits were used or
what inputs were wasted. The absence of any specific
supervision only encouraged the liberties taken at the
operational level. These conditions appeared to put the
policy’s sustainability at risk.
In the health centres, staff exploited the policy’s com-
plex terms of reference and product shortages, resulting
in gradual erosion of the free healthcare package, with
significant local discrepancies. Hence, since 2011, there
has been clear evidence of a decline in the quality of
services and a gradual shrinking of the scope of free
healthcare, with the writing of prescriptions (obliging
users to buy their own products) becoming almost a
matter of course for each caesarean.
The policy of free healthcare for malaria
National policy background
User fee exemption for the treatment of malaria in chil-
dren under five and pregnant women is Mali’s most
recent policy, introduced by the government in 2007. It is
particularly ambitious, in that it involves all the country’s
health centres and targets their two main clienteles: preg-
nant women and children under five. In fact, malaria is
the primary reason for consultation in health centres.
The free healthcare package consists of preventive treat-
ment (sulfadoxine/pyrimethamine) for pregnant women,
insecticide-treated nets, treatment of both uncomplicated
and severe malaria, and rapid diagnostic testing (RDT)
for under-fives and pregnant women. To qualify for free
healthcare, the malaria diagnosis must be confirmed by
RDT or thick blood smear.
Touré BMC Health Services Research 2015, 15(Suppl 3):S8
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/15/S3/S8
Page 7 of 12
This policy is being steered by the PNLP (national
malaria programme) and implemented by decentralized
services reporting directly to the National Directorate of
the Ministry of Health. The policy enjoys substantial
financial support from a variety of sources outside the
country, including the Global Fund, the (US) President’s
Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the World Bank, among
others.
The implementation of this policy in healthcare facilities
Officially, health professionals have not questioned the
policy. The presidential measures are difficult to fault
and, in terms of public health, this measure is beyond
reproach from an ethical standpoint. Rather, doubts
about the policy are expressed by the practices of the
caregivers, who clearly seek to reduce its scope. This
was clearly demonstrated by the situations we observed.
Healthcare personnel are not very forthcoming with
patients about free healthcare. Those who qualify for it
are not told about it from that quarter, and users system-
atically arrive with money in their pockets, unsure of the
truth of what they may have heard on the radio or TV.
Moreover, at some centres, it was only during our survey
that the information was communicated to users or even
to community officials. It is difficult for patients to claim
entitlement to a free service under such conditions.
Staff often refuse, moreover, to use RDTs or even
thick blood smears to confirm clinical diagnoses. Three
reasons are proffered to explain their relative indiffer-
ence to RDTs: clinical evidence of malaria, frequent
shortages of RDTs, and their presumed unreliability.
“Personally, I don’t wait for the result of the thick blood
smear to write out the prescription. We are tired of this
free healthcare. The test is slow, the patient can’t wait
and often it’s not even reliable. Fever, vomiting, diarrhoea
and loss of appetite are sufficient evidence that it’s
malaria,” (Staff member, CSCOM, Bamako).
“In any case, these tests are no good for Africans.
These products are sensitive. The conditions in which
they are transported, stored and even handled can cause
them to give incorrect results. And this is precisely what
happens, they are always giving wrong results. When a
child is brought to us with all the symptoms, we do the
test and it’s negative. But when we prescribe anti-malar-
ial drugs, we see him get better,” (Staff member,
CSCOM, Sikasso).
Lastly, the availability of free inputs in health centres is
very hit and miss. Although the blame for this rests partly
with the central administration, which is faced with a
daunting challenge, operational level practices also bear
considerable responsibility. They are clearly aimed at lim-
iting access to free treatment and at reducing the free
healthcare package. Most health centres submit reports
detailing their needs late and at irregular intervals, which
impedes planning along the whole chain (district, DRS
and PPM). In Bamako, reporting is particularly lax, and
this has gradually become accepted.
“From the start of free healthcare in 2007 until now,
we’ve never kept stock records. In any case, I don’t have
the time for that,... we’ve got enough work as it is.
What’s free is free. I make a request as soon as stock is
low or has run out, or I may even phone the medical
officer and inform him of the situation, and he sends
me something,” (Staff member, CSCOM, Bamako).
In the regions, where the situation is slightly better
than in Bamako, reporting remains poor. The data for
the district of Sikasso showed that fewer than 50% of the
district’s health centres submitted monthly reports.
In addition, shortages of inputs or incomplete test kits
are not alleviated by borrowing from the stock of local
health centres pending the next delivery. The governing
body of the community health associations even advises
its members, who manage the community health centres,
to charge users whenever stock shortages occur, citing
the maxim: “If there are no free medicines, there is no
free treatment for users.”
Finally, even when stocks of free inputs are available
in health centres, it does not necessarily follow that they
are accessible to the targeted categories of users. Staff
take advantage of certain loopholes in the system to
engineer local shortages: health centres are slow to col-
lect their allocations depending on local travel opportu-
nities. It is not uncommon for stock to be available at
the referral health centre while shortages of free inputs
are announced in outlying areas. At the same time, free
inputs are often less closely guarded than those that
generate revenue and hence are subject to all kinds of
temptations, especially theft. Staff may also set aside a
box of free products without using them so that, if there
is an inspection, they are not taken to task for allowing
supplies to run out:
“We haven’t had Co-Artesiane in stock for about ten
days, apart from a box that we are hanging on to, as we
could be inspected and caught without stock, which
doesn’t look good,” (Staff member, CSREF, Kita).
’Oversights’ in the prescribing of medicines also occur,
raising the question of whether such lapses might be
due to the desire to limit free healthcare; some respon-
dents acknowledged this was the case.
“The kits are not brought out, the doctors tell me they
forget to prescribe the kit for pregnant women. They let all
severe malaria cases pay for their own prescriptions. The
reality is that we are looking for money here at the com-
munity health centre,” (Staff member, CSCOM, Bamako).
Finally, access to free treatment was restricted to work-
days and working hours, i.e., between 8 am and noon or
2 pm, the managers having decided that staff on duty
outside these times, usually junior staff or trainees, were
not sufficiently reliable to manage free inputs.
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The policy has not been backed up by funding for
supervision, which is therefore incorporated into the
general supervision routinely conducted by district
teams. Between 2009 and 2011, this routine supervision
was rarely carried out due to lack of funding. Hence it
can be difficult to identify problematic practices at the
local level.
“We make do with the reports sent in by centre heads.
No one knows whether the products we give them are
put to proper use. In Mali, everyone wants to protect
their job and no one dares to say what things are really
like,” (Official, Regional health authority, Bamako).
Healthcare is not entirely free, as consultations and
medicines other than anti-malarials have to be paid for
(antipyretics and antibiotics). In the community health
centres observed in our study, we compared, for the
months of January and July of the study year, the aver-
age monthly bills for prescriptions for uncomplicated or
severe malaria, both with and without free healthcare.
The evidence showed that, despite the free medicines
policy, the amounts users are required to pay remain
substantial and prohibitive for disadvantaged families.
For instance, in one CSCOM in Bamako, under the free
healthcare system the average cost of a prescription for
treating an uncomplicated case of malaria was XOF
2,280 and for a severe case, XOF 4,337-only about XOF
1,000 and 1,500 less, respectively, than for cases that did
not qualify for free treatment (for example, children five
years and older).
The informal practices of health professionals reduced
the scope of the policy further still. Under such condi-
tions, free healthcare has little meaning, and thus it is
hardly surprising that its impact would be hampered. In
fact, a study on the impact of free healthcare on visits to
health centres in the different survey areas [18] con-
firmed that, although there had been a real increase in
the number of visits, the impact remained limited.
Discussion
Comparison of these policies reveals systematic
malfunctioning in the health system.
In presenting and comparing these three policies, whose
provisions and implementation conditions were all differ-
ent, this article shows that while they have all had gener-
ally positive outcomes in terms of quantitative impacts on
health centre use, they are being progressively stripped of
any real content, and their sustainability is uncertain pre-
cisely because of the malfunctions of the system in which
they are being implemented. While the national level has
had problems with planning, even more problematic has
been its incapacity to supervise and control health work-
ers’ illicit practices to compensate for salaries they con-
sider insufficient and which have not been affected by the
policies. In such a context, free care policies are like a
grain of sand in clockworks, an irritant in the health cen-
tres’ parallel functioning that incites workers to implement
strategies that undermine the policies’ sustainability. Thus,
contrary to the expectations often expressed, free health-
care policies, as implemented in this context, do not con-
stitute an opportunity to structure the health system more
effectively [19].
These policies were thus adopted differently by health
professionals, and their acceptability varied depending
on the extent to which they disrupted the habitual func-
tioning of the health system.
The concern for optimising HIV/AIDS management
led to implementation of a mechanism that was techni-
cally and financially supported by international donors
but not well integrated into the health system. This came
at a price, which was heavy dependence on external fund-
ing and progressive development of a two-tiered system,
public vs. associative, in which the public sector had no
share in the advantages made available to the associative
sector by the Global Fund, such as staff bonuses. In pub-
lic healthcare facilities, initial acceptance of this policy
and of some promising and effective innovations (psy-
chosocial approaches, adherence clubs, careful planning)
was gradually replaced by a commoditisation of treat-
ment rather than by an extension to other pathologies of
the principles underlying its success.
The free caesareans policy, whose measures were fully
integrated into healthcare services, was gradually
absorbed into the system. The discontent expressed
about increased workload without financial compensa-
tion in fact concealed other demands that could not be
articulated because they referred to dysfunctional prac-
tices that could not be openly revealed: the absenteeism
of certain categories of personnel; the use of volunteer or
underpaid staff, some of whom kept the services running
for several consecutive years; and the loss of informal
income that had, until then, significantly supplemented
the incomes of certain categories of personnel, particu-
larly managers. As well, the wastage of caesarean kits
because of lack of supervision led to a progressive under-
mining of the free healthcare package and a substantial
decline in quality of care. Thus, a recent study has shown
that the mean cost of treatment is not significantly differ-
ent between women receiving free caesareans (USD
107.00) and those with normal deliveries (USD 93.40). As
such, in this case, free healthcare no longer protects the
beneficiaries from catastrophic expenditure [14].
Free malaria treatment for children under five and
pregnant women, an ambitious and complex policy, is a
disruptive policy that provokes latent but effective oppo-
sition. In a context where, according to the health autho-
rities and the managers of the health centres studied, the
sale of anti-malarials is the major source of income for
health centres, these free inputs provided to healthcare
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facilities and the requirement for clinical diagnoses to be
confirmed through biological testing to limit unwar-
ranted malaria diagnoses arouse considerable anxiety
among both health professionals and the community lea-
ders of CSCOMs. This anxiety, motivated by this policy’s
ostensibly negative impact, has no basis in reality, as
demonstrated by the results of a study that very clearly
showed there was no such financial impact in any of the
CSCOMs studied [20]. In fact, because of the failure to
consider beforehand that the user fee exemption for
malaria would threaten the substantial income stream
that malaria represented for healthcare facilities, this free
policy is now faltering everywhere in Mali, including in
the sentinel sites, which are theoretically the best-per-
forming facilities.
The conclusion that health services malfunctions
impede free care policies, which in turn hamper the stra-
tegies implemented by health professionals, was reached
for other countries by our research program studying lar-
gely similar health systems [21]. Our conclusions also
agree with those of a literature review on the weaknesses
and malfunctions either produced or exacerbated by
exemption polices [11], whose consequences included, in
most cases, a decline in the quality of care.
The findings of this study, revealing malfunctions ran-
ging all the way from the centre to the most peripheral
points of the health system, raise questions about how
much attention is really given to the stated objective of
these policies, i.e., improving the population’s access to
care.
The idea that this issue of the financial accessibility of
services is not a core concern for health professionals is
corroborated by the findings of other studies as well.
The cost-recovery policy has been accepted everywhere
and applied zealously, and a study exploring health pro-
fessionals’ views on this policy showed it was widely
appreciated despite its disastrous consequences on
access to care [22]. Moreover, the failure of the user fee
exemption for indigents that had been envisioned in the
Bamako Initiative [23] is another illustration of the futi-
lity of attempts to reduce inequities of access to care.
With the advent of structural adjustments, the State’s
disengagement (reduced public funding) foisted onto
healthcare facilities, and particularly onto CSCOMs and
hospitals, an obligation to achieve results and balance bud-
gets-i.e., to be more efficient. This has since clearly evolved
into a quest for profitability, whether individual or
collective.
We have highlighted the personal profit motives
underlying the health professionals’ actions (profits gen-
erated by their illicit practices, which run counter to the
interests of patients or of the health centres in which
they work) and undermining the free care policies.
Thus, a study carried out across the entire region of
Sikasso highlighted the healthcare facilities’ solid finan-
cial status (profits generated at year’s end and some-
times even financial reserves) and, at the same time,
their inadequate equipment and the absence of any
measures (lower fees, free care for indigents) to improve
equity of access to care [24]. In centres with financial
surpluses, those cash reserves and surpluses were
neither re-invested in equipment for the centre, nor put
into a fund to support indigents, but instead re-invested
as end-of-year bonuses distributed to personnel.
Another study, this time in Burkina Faso, showed that
health centre management committees could viably use
their financial resources to improve the equity of access
to care, but that this was not something that occurred
to them spontaneously [25].
As such, improving the financial conditions for users’
access to good-quality services appears to be a second-
ary consideration.
Conclusion
This study of the actual implementation of the three
most recent user fees exemption policies in Mali shows
that they significantly increased the use of services and
free care and have been much appreciated by users. How-
ever, these policies potentially undermine certain prac-
tices of health professionals, whose primary concern is to
improve their own remuneration, which they consider to
be inadequate. As such, the scope of these policies has
gradually become more limited, jeopardizing their sus-
tainability. In countries that have functioned for the past
30 years according to a cost recovery model, user fee
exemption measures are seen as a relatively abrupt step
backward. Health professionals’ self-interest with regard
to user fees appears to have been underestimated [22].
The free healthcare policies sparked latent opposition,
expressed essentially through informal professional prac-
tices. In fact, the policies cannot be contested officially as
they are eminently political and ethically justified in
terms of public health. This raises the question of
whether there really is a shared concern to improve
equity in access to care, and whether the Malian State
has the capacity to impose a certain social justice, such as
bringing an end to the current climate of impunity mani-
fested in health workers’ informal practices. The reac-
tions of national authorities and international bodies to
this problem have not been equal to the task: imposing
successive reforms, with no provisions for appropriate
evaluation despite repeated failures, rather than looking
in-depth at African health systems and taking into
account their structural weaknesses, and especially the
profit-generating logic in which they are now entangled,
to the users’ detriment.
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This is not a matter of designating health professionals
as the new scapegoats. Rather, these malfunctions reflect
the State’s incapacity to exercise its regulatory role and to
establish policies that are “adapted to African health sys-
tems as they are in real life, and not on paper, taking into
account their dysfunctions, their difficulties, their
blockages, their bottlenecks. Which means recognizing
them and denouncing them” [author’s translation] [26].
International development agencies, for their part, have
not managed, in the 10 years since the Paris Declaration,
to align all their actions and practices with the national
policy framework [27], to harmonise their interventions-as
evidenced very recently in the management of the crisis in
northern Mali [28]-and to move away from a liberal con-
ception that has, since the Bamako Initiative, permeated
most public policies related to health. Moreover, a review
of the literature on the adverse consequences of innova-
tions has shown that studies on this topic are rare, with
the main limiting factor being funding agencies’ bias
toward funding only studies on the intended consequences
of innovations, and not unintended or negative conse-
quences [29]. Too often, “new public policies overlook
routine practices and presuppose an ideal health system-
and State-far removed from the everyday reality of the
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